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We examine the effect of factional demographic faultlines between two naturally 
occurring factions within Dutch pension fund boards on conflict management within 
these boards. Data on 313 Dutch pension fund boards confirm that factional demographic 
faultlines are positively related to competitive conflict management and moderately 
negatively related to cooperative conflict management. As predicted by faultline theory, 
these relationships are mediated by perceived subgroup formation. A noteworthy finding 
with clear managerial implications is that the disruptive effects from factional 
demographic faultlines are attenuated by board reflexivity. Moderated mediation analyses 
corroborate these findings. 
 
Keywords: Boards of directors, pension fund boards, factions, social categorization 
theory, demographic faultlines, perceived subgroup formation, reflexivity, conflict 
management.
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Board members bring their individual and constituencies' interests and commitments to 
the board (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994, p. 243) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There are several situations in which board members do not come to a board as 
independent entities, but rather as representatives of specific (interest) groups. For 
instance, following a merger, the board of directors of the newly formed organization will 
usually consist of board members from the two merged organizations. Similarly, boards 
of joint ventures will have board members who are appointed as delegates to protect their 
parents’ interests (Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001). Executives and non-executives can 
also be regarded as two subgroups that represent different interests (cf. Kaczmarek, 
Kimino, & Pye, forthcoming). A similar case can be made for boards of family firms. 
Research has shown that founding families have substantial stakes in the largest 
companies around (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999) and the boards of these firms consist of family and non-family board members who 
represent two different stakeholder groups. In this paper we argue that board members 
with different delegate affiliations can be viewed as “factional groups”, i.e. “groups in 
which members are representatives, or delegates, from a small number of (often just two) 
social entities and are aware of, and find salience in, their delegate status” (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005, p. 794). 
Factional affiliations among board members impose a first-order demarcation, 
affecting how additional elements of board member characteristics influence board 
decision making processes (Li & Hambrick, 2005). Accordingly, when demographic 
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characteristics align with factional affiliations – e.g., one factional group consisting of 
women in their thirties and one of men in their sixties – the demographic faultline 
between these factions will be strong. Demographic faultlines allow predictions about 
board processes that are difficult to generate with customary evaluations of diversity in 
terms of variety (see Harrison & Klein, 2007; Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Lau & 
Murnighan, 2005; Li & Hambrick, 2005). Importantly, faultline theory draws attention to 
negative effects of group diversity that have largely been ignored by the literature on 
board composition. In accordance with social categorization theory, demographic 
faultlines are likely to be associated with in-group/out-group stereotyping (Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998; Li & Hambrick, 2005; Tajfel, 1978), which, in turn, can be expected to 
have disruptive consequences for board decision making processes. 
We extend research on boards of directors and faultline theory in four distinct 
ways. First, we address both the question why and when diversity has detrimental effects 
on board processes and the issue of how to manage social categorization processes by 
reflecting on board functioning. In this context, although a great deal of literature on 
board composition interprets board diversity as a source of information that may benefit 
the board, few have interpreted diversity as a factor engendering subgroupings within 
boards, thereby negatively affecting board functioning. Admittedly, a number of recent 
studies acknowledge the possible disruptive effects of faultlines for boards of directors 
(e.g., Kaczmarek et al., forthcoming; Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010), yet these 
studies do not consider the process through which faultlines hamper board functioning. In 
this context, an important contribution of our present study is that we examine the process 
through which faultlines affect board functioning. We do so on the basis of information 
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on boards of Dutch pension funds. These boards are responsible for strategic investment 
choices. Pension fund boards provide an interesting setting, because they consist of pre-
established factional groups: their members are representatives of either employers or 
pension fund participants. 
A second important contribution of our current study is that we draw attention to 
the effect of faultlines on the way in which diverging interests are integrated and 
balanced during board deliberations. The management of such divergent interests is 
referred to as conflict management (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001; 
Somech, Desivilya, & Lidogoster, 2009), which may be considered as an important 
determinant of effective decision making (cf. Kaufman & Englander, 2005; Lan & 
Heracleous, 2010). Accordingly, we believe that an important contribution of our work is 
that it studies the determinants of conflict management within boards of directors. Given 
the importance for boards of managing divergent interests effectively, it is striking to note 
that conflict management has not been explicitly addressed in the literature on boards. 
Third, we contribute to the faultline literature by empirically investigating the 
mediating role of perceived subgroup formation as implied by social categorization and 
faultline theory. Indeed, whereas the literature on demographic faultlines has steadily 
increased and although diversity researchers have stressed that studies actually assessing 
subgroup formation as the categorization process implied by faultline theory are 
necessary (e.g. Homan, Greer, Jehn, & Koning, 2010; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Spell, 
Bezrukova, Haar, & Spell, 2011), few studies have actually assessed the in-group/out-
group categorization process that lies at the heart of faultline theory (see Thatcher & 
Patel, 2011, for a recent meta-analysis). We fill this research gap by including perceived 
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subgroup formation as the mediating mechanism linking factional demographic faultlines 
to conflict management strategies within boards. 
Fourth, we identify an important factor that attenuates the influence of factional 
demographic faultlines on social categorization processes, namely board reflexivity. 
Reflexivity is defined as the extent to which board members reflect on and adapt board 
functioning (cf. West, 1996; West, Garrod, & Carletta, 1997). Specifically, board 
reflexivity entails behavior affiliated with board evaluations, which are believed to be 
critical for the effective functioning of boards, because they facilitate reflection on board 
functioning (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005; Minichilli, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2007; Sonnenfeld, 
2002). Indeed, board evaluations are one of the principal requirements in many corporate 
governance codes (Minichilli et al., 2007). Notwithstanding the critical role ascribed to 
reflection on board functioning, however, no study that we are aware of has empirically 
assessed the moderating role of board reflexivity. Our empirical demonstration of the 
attenuating role of board reflexivity may therefore be considered as an important 




Factional Demographic Faultlines 
Lau and Murnighan (1998) introduced the concept of the demographic faultline as a 
potential dividing line that divides a group’s members on the basis of one or more 
attributes. A strong faultline exists when each subgroup is relatively homogeneous or 
tightly clustered around its own central tendency (e.g., all men are in their sixties) and the 
central tendencies of the two subgroups differ widely (e.g., all men are in their sixties and 
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all women are in their thirties). Faultline theory has its theoretical rationale in social 
categorization theory (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Rico, Molleman, Sanchez-Manzanares, 
& Van der Vegt, 2007; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). The stronger the 
demographic faultline, the more group members are expected to categorize themselves 
and others as similar in-group members and dissimilar out-group members (Tajfel, 1978), 
leading to ‘we-they’ distinctions and subgroup formation (Homan et al., 2008; Jehn, 
Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Lau & Murnighan, 1998). In this context, a recent meta-
analysis by Thatcher & Patel (2011), points out that demographic faultline strength 
diminishes group cohesion, satisfaction, and performance outcomes. 
Whereas Lau and Murnighan (1998) proposed that faultlines occur by chance (see 
also Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto, & Thatcher, 2009; Choi & 
Sy, 2010; Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003), many groups can be viewed as having 
‘engineered’ faultlines (Li & Hambrick, 2005). Specifically, when members of a group 
are representatives of outside entities, “a demarcation is established that becomes the 
basis on which other elements of demography need to be assessed” (Li & Hambrick, 
2005, p. 797). Such groups consist of members that are aware of, and find salience in, 
their delegate status (adapted from Li & Hambrick, 2005, p. 794) and may be dubbed 
factional groups. In factional groups the faultline can be located according to the 
membership of the representative factions (Li & Hambrick, 2005). This first order 
demarcation, imposed by factional affiliations, affects how additional elements of 
demography affect board processes. A strong factional faultline then exists “when two 
factions differ in their averages and each faction is tightly clustered around its own 
average” (Li & Hambrick, 2005, p. 804, emphasis in original). For example, a board in 
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which one faction consists of men in their sixties and another faction of women in their 
thirties would have a strong factional demographic faultline. In accordance with social 
categorization and faultline theory, it can be expected that the alignment of additional 
demographic characteristics with such factional affiliations makes each side feel it is 
facing a monolithic adversary, thereby keeping members psychologically located within 
their factional groups. 
 
Conflict Management 
The management of divergent interests is referred to as conflict management (De Dreu et 
al., 2001; Somech et al., 2009). Conflict management reflects interaction patterns 
employed when group members deal with opposing views, and can be expected to be 
particularly relevant for boards of directors, especially those that consist of factional 
groups representing diverging interests. It is important to note here that the way group 
members believe one anothers’ goals to be related affects their expectations and actions, 
and thereby the consequences of interaction (De Dreu, 2007; Deutsch, 1973; Tjosvold, 
1998). Accordingly, to better understand decision making processes in boards of directors 
it is critical to understand how board members choose between conflict management 
strategies. Indeed, several studies have shown the pervasive effects of conflict 
management within working teams (Behfar, Peterson, Mannix, & Trochim, 2008; Chen, 
Liu, & Tjosvold, 2005; Hempel, Zhang, & Tjosvold, 2009; Tekleab, Quigley, & Tesluk, 
2009). 
In line with Deutsch’s (1973) theory of cooperation and competition there are two 
main approaches to managing conflicts, namely competitive and cooperative conflict 
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management strategies. Competitive conflict management is characterized by low 
concern for the other party. Group members view their interests as incompatible with the 
interests of the other party; emphasizing their divergent goals, they view a conflict as a 
win-lose situation and do whatever is necessary to ensure that their ideas prevail. This 
generally leads to closed discussions and frustrated communication (Chen et al., 2005). 
The conflict management literature provides support for the position that competitive 
approaches to conflict management lead to negative outcomes (Rahim, 2000; Somech et 
al., 2009). Alternatively, cooperative conflict management is characterized by high levels 
of concern for the other party in resolving a conflict. Group members tend to work 
towards mutually beneficial solutions and view conflicts as a joint problem, involving 
exchange of information about priorities and preferences, revealing insights, and making 
trade-offs between important and unimportant issues (De Dreu et al., 2001). In 
cooperative conflict management group members handle their conflict more 
constructively to the benefit of team functioning (Somech et al., 2009). 
As noted, when the factional demographic faultline is strong, demographic 
differences are more likely to result in social categorization processes leading to ‘we-
they’ distinctions and inter-subgroup animosity (Homan et al., 2008; Jehn et al., 1999; 
Lau & Murnighan, 1998) thereby disrupting behavioral integration (Bezrukova, Thatcher, 
Jehn, & Spell, forthcoming; Li & Hambrick, 2005). Accordingly, we propose that 
factional demographic faultlines make it more likely for the factions to manage their 
differences in a competitive way. Therefore, we expect that factional demographic 
faultlines are positively related to competitive conflict management. Conversely, when 
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the demographic faultline is weak, polarization between the factions becomes less likely 
and board members can be expected to resolve their differences in a cooperative way. 
 
H1a: Factional demographic faultline strength will be positively related to 
competitive conflict management. 
 
H1b: Factional demographic faultline strength will be negatively related to 
cooperative conflict management. 
 
Perceived Subgroup Formation 
Diversity affects group performance to the extent that it is perceived by group members 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007; Homan et al., 2010; Lawrence, 1997). Pertaining to faultlines 
specifically, Lau & Murnighan’s (1998) assert that even when faultlines appear likely, 
they must be made active in order to affect group processes. It is therefore important to 
realize that social categorization processes stemming from demographic faultlines do not 
always occur (van Knippenberg, Dawson, West, & Homan, 2010). The faultline must be 
salient for it to increase the potential for subgrouping (Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998). Indeed, diversity scholars have argued that it is the perception of 
subgroup formation, rather than demographic faultlines per se, that has negative effects 
on group functioning (e.g., Homan et al., 2010; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Spell et al., 
2011; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Thus, in the context of our current study, we 
should gauge the categorization processes implied by faultline theory to assess whether 
the factional demographic faultline is indeed salient (see also Homan et al., 2010; Jehn & 
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Bezrukova, 2010). Specifically, we hypothesize that factional demographic faultlines are 
positively related to perceived subgroup formation as the probability that group members 
perceive subgroups increases with the existence of stronger factional demographic 
faultlines. 
 
H2: Factional demographic faultline strength will be positively related to 
perceived subgroup formation. 
 
By extension, we argue that the effects of factional demographic faultlines on conflict 
management are carried through by perceived subgroup formation. It is the perceived 
formation of subgroups, rather than just factional demographic faultlines, that influences 
conflict management strategies within boards of directors. We therefore hypothesize that 
perceived subgroup formation mediates the relationship between factional demographic 
faultlines and conflict management strategies. 
 
H3a: Perceived subgroup formation will mediate the positive relationship 
between factional demographic faultline strength and competitive conflict 
management. 
 
H3b: Perceived subgroup formation will mediate the negative relationship 
between factional demographic faultline strength and cooperative conflict 
management. 
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Moderating Effect of Board Reflexivity 
Acknowledging that demographic faultlines do not always engender subgroupings and 
that the faultline must be salient for it to increase the potential for subgrouping, we can 
identify factors that attenuate the relationship between factional demographic faultlines 
and perceived subgroup formation. In this context, several authors stress the importance 
of board evaluations, because such evaluations facilitate board members to reflect on past 
board functioning and adapt board processes and procedures accordingly (e.g., Conger, 
Finegold, & Lawler, 1998; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Kiel & Nicholson, 2005; Leblanc, 
2005; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
From a salience of categorization perspective, reflecting on board functioning 
should stimulate board members to build a shared frame of reference (van Ginkel & van 
Knippenberg, 2009). Openly discussing dysfunctional routines and views about 
performance problems concerning the board as a whole fosters the reframing of cognitive 
representations (de Jong & Elfring, 2010; Schippers, Den Hartog, Koopman, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008; West, 2000). Research by Van der Vegt et al. (2010), for instance, 
demonstrates that group feedback promotes a collective orientation within workgroups 
fostering orientation towards the workgroup as a whole. Similarly, Bezrukova et al. 
(forthcoming) point out that without shared goals and expectations, group members are 
more likely to categorize themselves and others into subgroups on the basis of differences 
(see also van Knippenberg et al., 2010). 
Board reflexivity entails behavior associated with board evaluations. Board (or 
team) reflexivity is conceptualized as “the extent to which group members overtly reflect 
upon, and communicate about the group’s objectives, strategies and processes, and adapt 
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them to current or anticipated circumstances” (West et al., 1997, p. 296). It involves 
behaviors such as questioning, debating, exploratory learning, analyzing, divertive 
exploration, making explicit use of knowledge and reviewing past events (West, 1996). 
Reflexivity has been identified as an important instrument for identifying and addressing 
disruptive processes within teams (Nederveen-Pieterse, Van Knippenberg, & Van Ginkel, 
2011; Schippers, Den Hartog, & Koopman, 2007; Schippers, Den Hartog, Koopman, & 
Wienk, 2003; West, 2000). Recent research by Nederveen-Pieterse et al. (2011), indeed, 
demonstrates that reflexivity is instrumental in creating a shared understanding in 
workgroups and thus reduces the negative effects from diversity. We therefore 
hypothesize that board reflexivity attenuates the relationship between factional 
demographic faultlines and perceived subgroup formation, because it is likely to render 
demographic subgroupings less salient. 
 
H4: Board reflexivity will moderate the relationship between factional 
demographic faultline strength and perceived subgroup formation, such that the 
relationship between factional demographic faultline strength and perceived 
subgroup formation will be weaker when board reflexivity is high. 
 
Assuming that board reflexivity moderates the relationship between factional 
demographic faultlines and perceived subgroup formation, board reflexivity is also likely 
to influence the strength of the indirect relationship (i.e. through perceived subgroup 
formation) between factional demographic faultlines and competitive conflict 
management and cooperative conflict management, respectively – thereby predicting a 
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pattern of moderated mediation (or conditional indirect effects), as depicted in Figure 1. 
Because we predict a weak relationship between factional demographic faultlines and 
perceived subgroup formation when board reflexivity is high and a strong relationship 
between factional demographic faultlines when board reflexivity is low, we hypothesize 
the following; 
 
H5a: Board reflexivity will moderate the positive indirect effect of factional 
demographic faultline strength on competitive conflict management (through 
perceived subgroup formation).  Specifically, perceived subgroup formation will 
mediate this indirect effect when board reflexivity is low but not when it is high. 
 
H5b: Board reflexivity will moderate the negative indirect effect of factional 
demographic faultline strength on cooperative conflict management (through 
perceived subgroup formation).  Specifically, perceived subgroup formation will 
mediate this indirect effect when board reflexivity is low but not when it is high. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
METHOD 
Sample and data collection 
To empirically assess the model described in Figure 1, we use information on boards of 
Dutch pension funds. Pension funds in the Netherlands provide pension schemes on top 
of the basic old-age pension provided by the state. Although there is no statutory 
obligation for employers to offer a pension scheme to their employees, more than 95 per 
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cent of all Dutch employees are covered. Both employers and employees contribute to the 
pension fund. Pension benefits are financed by pension contributions paid in the past and 
accumulated by investment yields. Pension funds are governed by boards representing of 
two stakeholder groups, namely pension scheme participants on the one hand, and 
employers on the other. These boards are responsible for strategic decisions, such as the 
allocation of the fund’s assets. The employers and pension scheme participants in the 
boards have different interests. Participants will receive pension benefits after retirement 
and thus have a clear interest in maximizing pensions, whereas the employers attempt to 
minimize their financial contributions to the pension fund. We expect that board members 
are aware of their status as representatives of the two groups and that they act in 
accordance with their sponsored status (Goodstein et al., 1994). The diverging interests 
between employers and participants can be expected to foster a priori suspicion towards 
the other party. Thus, by their very nature, pension fund boards show a clear factional 
demarcation. 
We used data on Dutch pension fund board characteristics, processes and 
behavior. To test our hypotheses, we distributed a questionnaire survey to all board 
members of pension funds that were registered with the Dutch Central Bank (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, DNB) in December 2009. DNB is the supervisory authority for 
pension funds in the Netherlands. Under Dutch law, pension funds are legally and 
financially independent from the sponsoring companies. In the Netherlands there are 
three different types of pension funds:  industry-wide pension funds (for a specific 
industry or sector), corporate pension funds (for a single firm), and pension funds for 
independent professionals, such as dentists. 
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To maximize the response rate for this survey, we conducted a pretest of the 
questionnaire with an expert panel that consisted of five practitioners with knowledge on 
pension funds and six academics conducting research on boards of directors and 
teamwork in general. We asked these experts to discuss each survey question and to 
provide feedback on the content and on the instructions we provided. We used this 
feedback to improve the clarity and design of the survey, making it more appealing for 
board members to complete. In selecting the scales and developing the questionnaire, 
moreover, we cooperated extensively with a consultancy firm primarily active within the 
Dutch pension sector. To further increase participation, we published several calls for 
participation in practitioner journals, digital newsletters for pension fund practitioners, 
and through the association of pension funds in The Netherlands. 
We sent questionnaires to 2,917 board members of 541 pension fund boards for 
whom we had access to individual mailing addresses; 754 board members (26 per cent) 
from 353 boards (47 per cent) completed and returned the questionnaire. To minimize 
concerns of common source variance and to keep the questionnaire as short as possible in 
order to promote participation, we collected archival data on board member 
characteristics ourselves. Data on gender, age, and factional group affiliation was used to 
calculate factional demographic faultlines for the participating boards. In order to 
calculate these measures we needed complete information on gender, age, and factional 
group affiliation for all board members. Missing data for any of these characteristics for a 
single board member would prevent us from calculating the factional demographic 
faultline for the board as a whole. We collected data using annual reports of the pension 
funds, the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and additional information from the DNB. We 
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excluded pension funds that did not have board members appointed by both stakeholder 
groups – these were pension funds that no longer had employer appointed board members 
since the employer organization had ceased to exist – and we excluded boards that had 
only one board member appointed by the stakeholder groups, since a faction consisting of 
a single board member cannot really be considered as a subgroup (Thatcher et al. 2003). 
All in all, out of 353 participating boards we were able to gather complete information on 
313 boards (consisting of 2,177 board members) that had multiple board members 
appointed to both factions. We used these 313 boards for our analyses. For these boards, 
we received one evaluation of board decision making processes for 107 boards and 




Competitive conflict management was measured with the forcing conflict management 
strategy measure taken from the updated version of the Dutch Test for Conflict Handling 
(DUTCH) (De Dreu et al., 2001). We adapted the four items to reflect competitive 
conflict management as a group level construct for boards (see also Somech et al., 2009). 
Board members were asked to indicate how often board members engaged in competitive 
conflict management (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Specific items included: “Board 
members push their own points through”; and “Board members fight for a good outcome 
for themselves”. Cronbach’s alpha was .71. 
Cooperative conflict management was measured with the problem solving conflict 
management strategy measure taken from the updated version of DUTCH (De Dreu et al., 
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2001). We adapted the four items to reflect cooperative conflict management as a group 
level construct. Board members were asked to indicate how often board members 
engaged in cooperative conflict management (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Specific 
items included: “Board members examine issues until they find a solution that really 
satisfies all parties”; and “Board members consider ideas from both sides to find a 
mutually optimal solution”. Cronbach’s alpha was .70. 
 
Perceived subgroup formation 
We measured perceived subgroup formation with a measure developed by Jehn and 
Bezrukova (2010) (see also Cronin, Bezrukova, Weingart, & Tinsley, 2011; Homan et al., 
2010). We adapted the three items to reflect perceived subgroup formation for boards in 
particular. The specific items included: “The board splits into subgroups during board 
meetings”, “The board divides into subsets of board members” and “The board breaks 
into groups during board meetings”. These items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .76. 
 
Board reflexivity 
Board reflexivity was measured with five items adapted from the team reflexivity 
measure of Schippers et al. (2007) that is based on the scale developed by Swift and West 
(1998) (see also Schippers et al., 2008). The measure of Schippers et al. (2007) focuses 
specifically on group interaction processes associated with reflection on actions and 
outcomes. We adapted the items to reflect board reflexivity in particular. Specific items 
include “We regularly discuss whether the board is working effectively” and “We 
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regularly reflect on the way in which we communicate”. These items were rated on a 
7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .91. 
 
Factional demographic faultlines 
Since our theoretical framework builds on social categorization theory we included board 
member characteristics associated with social category diversity. We measured factional 
demographic faultlines along two social category characteristics: age and gender. We 
chose these demographic variables based on previous research on group diversity, 
indicating the prominence of these variables for social category diversity (Bezrukova et 
al., 2009; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Li & Hambrick, 2005; Milliken & Martins, 1996; 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999) and based on the availability of data on these 
characteristics for board members in our sample.  
 As recommended by faultline scholars, our faultline measure is a combination of 
the strength of the faultline split (i.e. how cleanly a board splits into two factional groups) 
and the faultline distance or width (i.e. how far the factional groups are apart) (Bezrukova 
et al., 2009; Bezrukova et al., forthcoming; Zanutto, Bezrukova, & Jehn, 2011). First, the 
strength of the faultline splits was measured. We calculated the percentage of total 
variation in overall group characteristics accounted for by the two factions, by 
calculating, for every board, the ratio of the between-faction sum of squares to the total 
sum of squares. This statistic measures the degree of alignment of attributes within the 
factions. For example, in the context of our study, if all employer appointed board 
members are male and in their forties and all participant appointed board members are 
female and in their thirties, the two factional groups can be cleanly split into two 
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homogeneous subgroups. This board would be characterized by a strong faultline split, 
since all variation in group characteristics is captured by differences between factions. 
We followed the procedure developed by Thatcher et al. (2003), which is consistent with 
Lau and Murnighan’s (1998) original framework, in estimating how the alignment of 
multiple attributes divides a group into subgroups (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Bezrukova, 
Spell, & Perry, 2010; Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Molleman, 2005). Rather than calculating 
demographic faultlines for all possible combinations of subgroups and retaining the 
single maximum faultline score1, we calculated the demographic faultline for the two pre-
existing factions, as factional affiliations already constituted a first order demarcation. 
Second, we measured the distance between the factions (Bezrukova et al., 2009; 
Bezrukova et al., forthcoming; Spell et al., 2011; Zanutto et al., 2011), which indicates 
the degree of difference between the factions (Bezrukova et al., forthcoming). We applied 
the distance measure developed by Bezrukova et al. (2009), which can be determined by 
calculating the distance between the subgroup centroids (the Euclidean distance between 
the two sets averages of affiliation, gender and age). For example, in the context of our 
study, the faction distance within a board with male employer appointed board members 
in their sixties and female participant employer board members in their thirties is greater 
than it would be if the male members were in their forties. 
Finally, in line with recommendations by Zanutto et al. (2011, see also Bezrukova 
et al., forthcoming; Homan et al., 2010; Spell et al., 2011) the strength and distance 
scores were standardized and subsequently multiplied to account for the joint effect of the 
faultline split and the distance between the factions (Zanutto et al., 2011, p. 708). The 
                                                 
1 A board of n individuals can be split in 2n-1-1 ways. For example, a board of eight board members can be 
split into 127 different ways. 
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rationale for this approach is that for social categorization processes to occur, it matters 
whether the in-groups are homogeneous (emphasis on in-group similarities) and whether 
the out-groups are different (emphasis on out-group differences).  
Indeed, faultline theory draws on the principle of comparative fit pertaining to 
within-group similarities and between-group differences (Spell et al., 2011). Drawing 
from social categorization theory, group members are expected to categorize themselves 
and others as similar in-group members and dissimilar out-group members (Tajfel, 1978). 
Accordingly, faultlines become stronger with the alignment between the number of 
attributes along which two subgroups (capturing within-group similarities) and with the 
difference between subgroups (capturing between-group differences). A combined 
faultline measure incorporating faultline split and faultline distance captures both within-
subgroup similarity and between-subgroup difference, which is consistent with the notion 
that in-group similarities and out-group differences drive categorization salience (Homan 
et al., 2010; van Knippenberg et al., 2010; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). 
In addition, this interpretation is line with Li and Hambrick’s (2005) original 
interpretation of factional faultlines that strong factional faultlines exists “when two 
factions differ in their averages and each faction is tightly clustered around its own 
average” (p. 804, emphasis in original). We therefore incorporated this overall faultline 
index in our analyses. 
 
Control Variables  
Pension fund controls 
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We controlled for the difference between company pension funds, independent 
professional pension funds and sector pension funds by including a sector fund dummy 
and an independent professional fund dummy. Another consideration relevant for our 
sample of pension fund boards is that large organizations are more visible to the public 
and are likely to be under close scrutiny, affecting how the board will operate (Hillman, 
Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). Research shows that the size of the organization 
influences board decision making. Organization size is generally included through 
logarithmic transformation (Boivie, Lange, McDonald, & Westphal, Forthcoming; Datta, 
Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009; Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011; Kroll, 
Walters, & Le, 2007; Westphal & Stern, 2006). Accordingly, we controlled for pension 
fund size measured as the natural log of the number of participants. The average number 
of pension fund participants was 44,979. 
 
Board controls 
In line with research on diversity and boards of directors, we also controlled for board 
size, because group size is known to influence group dynamics (Hillman et al., 2007; 
Kroll et al., 2007; Tuggle et al., 2010). Moreover, larger groups have more potential for 
diversity (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Li & Hambrick, 2005). In selecting our control 
variables with respect to board member characteristics, we included the variables that 
were available in our dataset and that have been shown to influence group processes and 
interaction between group members. We took several steps to isolate the unique effects of 
faultlines. 
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First, we closely followed the procedures of Bezrukova et al. (2007) and Lau and 
Murnighan (2005) to control for heterogeneity effects (see also Bezrukova et al., 2009; Li 
& Hambrick, 2005). Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index was used to measure 
heterogeneity for categorical variables (e.g., gender). In addition, to measure age 
diversity we calculated the standard deviation (cf. Bezrukova et al., 2010; Harrison & 
Klein, 2007; Li & Hambrick, 2005). Following procedures suggested by Jehn et al. 
(1999) – and used in recent diversity research (Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002) as well as 
in faultline research specifically (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Li & Hambrick, 2005) – we 
averaged these heterogeneity variables to arrive at a demographic heterogeneity control 
variable. Second, we controlled for the mean demographic profiles by including mean 
board member age and the percentage of female board members. The mean itself acts as 
an important confound and should therefore be included in diversity tests (Harrison & 
Klein, 2007; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Li & Hambrick, 2005), because what 
appear to be diversity effects may actually be the effect of the mean. 
 
Discriminant and convergent validity 
We used confirmatory factor analysis to assess the discriminant and convergent validity 
of the scales used in the hypothesized model. We computed parameter estimates using the 
LISREL 8.80 software package with the maximum likelihood method. We first tested a 
model with the four intended constructs (perceived subgroup formation, board reflexivity, 
competitive conflict management and cooperative conflict management). The overall fit 
of the model was adequate (χ2=335.12, df=98, p<.001), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI) 
was .90, the comparative fit index (CFI) was .95, and the root mean square error of 
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approximation (RMSEA) was .079. In addition, the factor loadings were all significant at 
p<.001. To evaluate the discriminant validity of our measures, we tested four alternative 
models. For the first alternative model, competitive conflict management and cooperative 
conflict management loaded on one latent conflict management construct, while the other 
factors remained unchanged (Δ χ2=241.592, df=3, p<.001, GFI=.84, CFI=.91, 
RMSEA=.110). For the second alternative model, perceived subgroup formation and 
competitive conflict management loaded on a single latent factor (Δ χ2=109.18, df=3, 
p<.001, GFI=.88, CFI=.93, RMSEA=.093). In the third alternative model board 
reflexivity and cooperative conflict management loaded on a single latent factor (Δ 
χ2=429.25, df=3, p<.001, GFI=.80, CFI=.88, RMSEA=.129). The fourth alternative 
model contained one latent construct for all items (Δ χ2=1488.61, df=7, p<.001, GFI=.63, 
CFI=.72, RMSEA=.204). The fit for all of these alternative models was significantly 
worse than the hypothesized measurement model. 
 
Level of analysis 
The unit of theory in the present study was the board. Perceived subgroup formation, 
board reflexivity, competitive conflict management and cooperative conflict management 
were represented by an aggregate of individual board member responses. As noted above, 
multiple ratings were received for 206 of the 313 boards. We anticipated that it would not 
be possible to collect all responses from board members of a particular board, making it 
necessary to rely on a subsample of board members reporting on the constructs of 
interest. We therefore followed a referent shift informant sampling approach in which we 
framed all items at the board level, asking board members to evaluate their board rather 
                                                 
2 All Δ χ2 are in comparison to the hypothesized model. 
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than their own personal behaviors or attitudes (cf. Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999; Van 
der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). An informant sampling approach recognizes that many 
members of a particular board are qualified to provide ratings on board properties. If 
convergence between different raters is demonstrated, a balanced perspective can be 
obtained by averaging individual board member responses to represent board level 
constructs (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984). Thus, it was critical to demonstrate within-
board agreement and to evaluate the measurement assumption that responses by members 
of the same board converged (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) We calculated the rwg(j) inter-
agreement coefficient for multi-item indices (James et al., 1984; James, Demaree, & 
Wolf, 1993). The median values were .86, .93, .87 and .92, respectively, for perceived 
subgroup formation, board reflexivity, competitive conflict management and cooperative 
conflict management. These values indicate, first, that it makes sense to average 
evaluations by multiple raters and, second, that single-rater evaluations provide reliable 
information where multiple ratings cannot be obtained (see also Bunderson, 2003). 
In addition, we may also expect the variation between ratings by members of the 
same board to be more similar than ratings by members of other boards (Bliese, 2000). 
This was investigated by calculating the intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC1 and 
ICC2; Bliese, 2000). One-way analysis of variance suggested that ratings differed 
significantly between boards. All ICC1 values were highly significant (p<.001). The ICC1 
and ICC2 for perceived subgroup formation were .24 and .47, for board reflexivity .19 
and .40, for competitive conflict management .21 and .43, and for cooperative conflict 
management 0.18 and 0.38. As indicated by James (1982) ICC1 generally ranges from 0 
to .50 with a median of .12 while ICC2 is a simple function of ICC1 and the average 
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number of respondents (Bliese, 2000). However, there are no definitive guidelines for 
determining acceptable values (see also Somech et al., 2009). In our present study all 
scales exceed the .12 median ICC1 score .12 and are highly significant, indicating that 
aggregation is justified (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). All in all, these numbers indicate that 
board members agreed sufficiently in their ratings to justify aggregation. 
 
Analytical methodology 
We used hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test our hypotheses. To test 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we regressed factional demographic faultlines on competitive and 
cooperative conflict management, respectively (Models 5 and 8 in Table 2). Similarly, we 
regressed factional demographic faultlines on perceived subgroup formation to test 
hypothesis 2 (model 2 in Table 2). 
In Hypothesis 3 we posited that perceived subgroup formation will mediate the 
relationship between factional demographic faultlines and conflict management. The 
Sobel test assumes that the indirect effect is normally distributed. However, recent 
research shows that the indirect effect may not be normally distributed, even if the 
independent and the mediating variable are (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). Therefore, 
bootstrapping is recommended. In order to investigate the hypothesized indirect effect (or 
mediation) we utilized the macro developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008). This macro 
facilitates bootstrapping methods that are more powerful than stepwise procedures and 
generates the recommended bias-corrected confidence intervals. By applying bootstrap 
procedures, it is possible to gauge the significance of the indirect effect, while avoiding 
power problems from non-normal sampling distributions of the indirect effect (see Table 
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3). Additionally, we also regressed perceived subgroup formation on competitive and 
cooperative conflict management (Model 6 and Model 9 in Table 2) to assess whether the 
relationship between factional demographic faultlines and conflict management decreases 
when we include perceived subgroup formation.  
According to Hypothesis 4, board reflexivity moderates the relationship between 
factional demographic faultlines and perceived subgroup formation. Following the 
recommendations of Aiken and West (1991), we mean-centered the variables involved in 
calculating the interaction terms and calculated interaction effects by taking the product 
of these mean-centered variables. To test Hypothesis 4 we regressed this interaction term 
on perceived subgroup formation (Model 3, Table 2). If Hypothesis 4 receives support, it 
is plausible that the indirect effect of factional demographic faultlines on competitive and 
cooperative conflict management through perceived subgroup formation is conditional on 
board reflexivity. This is also known as moderated mediation (Preacher, Rucker, & 
Hayes, 2007). In order to investigate these hypothesized conditional indirect effects as 
proposed by Hypotheses 5a and 5b, we utilized the bootstrapping macro developed by 
Preacher et al. (2007), which was specifically designed for moderated mediation analyses 




Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and Pearson zero-order correlations 
between variables. The average age of board members was 54 years, an average board 
has approximately seven members and nine percent of the board members were female. 
A TALE OF TWO FACTIONS 
 27
As can be seen from Table 1, the percentage of female board members and the age of 
board members are significantly negatively related, indicating that boards with a higher 
percentage of female board members are, on average, also younger. Not surprisingly, we 
see that the number of participants is significantly positively related with board size, 
indicating that bigger pension funds have bigger boards. There is a strong relationship 
between the percentage of female board members and board heterogeneity, signifying 
that board heterogeneity is to a large extent driven by the presence of female board 
members. Board size and perceived subgroup formation are positively related, which is in 
line with the contention that there is more potential for subgroup formation in larger 
groups. Moreover, although not hypothesized, board reflexivity is negatively related to 
competitive conflict management and perceived subgroup formation and positively 
related to cooperative conflict management. In interpreting this relationship, one should 
keep in mind that conflict management and board reflexivity are rated by the same 
source. All in all, the correlations do not warrant concerns over multicollinearity issues. 
In addition, none of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) in the regression analyses 
approached 10, the commonly accepted threshold indicating a potential problem; all were 
well below 3 (the maximum value was 2.27). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Hypothesis tests3 
                                                 
3 We excluded five cases from our regression analyses since these cases deviated more than three 
standardized residuals from their predicted values. The results did not change when we included these 
cases. 
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Table 2 presents the results of the regression analyses, while Tables 3 and 4 show the 
results for the indirect effects and conditional indirect effect, respectively. According to 
Hypothesis 1a the factional demographic faultline is positively related to competitive 
conflict management. Table 2 (Model 5) shows a significant positive coefficient (β = .18, 
p < .001), supporting hypothesis 1a. Similarly, under Hypothesis 1b, there is a negative 
relationship between factional demographic fautllines and cooperative conflict 
management. Table 2 (Model 8) provides moderate support, as the negative coefficient is 
only marginally significant (β = -.09, p < .10). 
Hypothesis 2 posits that factional demographic faultlines are positively related to 
perceived subgroup formation. As shown in Table 2 (Model 2) the coefficient for 
factional demographic faultline is positive and significant (β = .18, p < .001), a result 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, according to hypotheses 3a and 3b, perceived 
subgroup formation mediates the relationship between factional demographic faultlines 
and, respectively, competitive and cooperative conflict management. Table 3 reports the 
indirect effects of factional demographic faultlines on competitive and cooperative 
conflict management through perceived subgroup formation. The 95 per cent 
bootstrapped confidence interval excludes zero for both competitive conflict management 
(.01, .10) and cooperative conflict management (-.07, -.01). Thus we find, as anticipated, 
a positive indirect effect for competitive conflict management and a negative indirect 
effect for cooperative conflict management supporting Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that board reflexivity moderates the relationship between 
factional demographic faultlines and perceived subgroup formation. We tested this 
hypothesis by adding the interaction term between factional demographic faultlines and 
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board reflexivity to Model 2 in Table 2, to arrive at Model 3. The coefficient for the 
interaction term is negative and significant (β = -.17, p < .001). Model 3 also 
demonstrates that in addition to its moderating effect, board reflexivity is negatively 
related to perceived subgroup formation. Thus, although not hypothesized, board 
reflexivity has a significant negative direct effect on perceived subgroup formation, in 
addition to its moderating effect. This indicates that in addition to attenuating the 
disruptive effects of factional demographic faultlines, board reflexivity also has beneficial 
effects on board functioning itself. In interpreting this direct relationship one should keep 
in mind, however, that this direct relationship may result from a common source, because 
subgroup formation and conflict management are rated by the same board members. 
To gain further insight into the nature of the interaction effect, we plotted the 
relationship between factional demographic faultlines and perceived subgroup formation 
at high and low values of board reflexivity (one standard deviation above and below the 
mean, respectively) (cf. Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 2 presents the resulting graph and 
confirms that factional demographic faultlines are positively related to perceived 
subgroup formation when board reflexivity is low, but not when it is high. Simple slope 
analyses indeed confirm that the slope of the relationship between factional demographic 
faultlines and perceived subgroup formation is significant when board reflexivity is high 
(β = .42, p < .001), but not when it is low (β = .03, p > .10). Although these results show 
that factional demographic faultlines interact with board reflexivity, they do not directly 
assess the conditional indirect effects proposed in Hypotheses 5a and 5b. We therefore 
examined the conditional indirect effect of factional demographic faultlines on conflict 
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management (through perceived subgroup formation) at different levels of board 
reflexivity. 
Table 4 presents the indirect effects for competitive conflict management (Panel 
A) and cooperative conflict management (Panel B) at three different values of board 
reflexivity: low or one standard deviation below the mean (-0.98), the mean (0.00), and 
high or one standard deviation above the mean (0.98). The results in Table 4, Panel A 
indicate that where board reflexivity is low or at the mean, the indirect effect is 
significant. The 95 per cent bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence interval excludes zero 
for both low board reflexivity (.05, .20) and mean board reflexivity (.02, .11), but it does 
not exclude zero when board reflexivity is high (-.02, .07). This signifies that there is a 
positive conditional indirect effect when board reflexivity is low or at the mean, but not 
when board reflexivity is high, supporting Hypothesis 5a. Similarly, Panel B reports a 
negative indirect effect when board reflexivity is low or at the mean. The 95 per cent 
bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence interval excludes zero for both low (-.09, -.02) 
and mean board reflexivity (-.05, -.01), but it does not exclude zero when board 
reflexivity is high (-.04, .01). Thus, as anticipated, we find a negative indirect effect when 
board reflexivity is low, but not when board reflexivity is high. We already noted for 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b that the confidence interval barely excludes zero for both 
competitive and cooperative conflict management, corroborating our finding that the 
indirect effect is moderated by board reflexivity. The indirect effect for both competitive 
and cooperative conflict management is particularly strong when board reflexivity is low. 
Finally, in addition to the results for the indirect effects presented in Table 3 and 
Table 4, Model 6 and Model 9 in Table 2 allow examination of the mediated effects by 
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adding perceived subgroup formation to the regression model. This results in a significant 
increase in explained variance in Model 6 (.22) and Model 9 (.13). Furthermore, the 
relationship between factional demographic faultlines and conflict management becomes 
insignificant when perceived subgroup formation is added to the model. These results 
corroborate the finding that perceived subgroup formation mediates the effects of 
factional demographic faultlines on competitive and cooperative conflict management. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results reported in this article suggest that demographic faultlines between 
stakeholder factions have ramifications for boards of directors. Our results demonstrate 
that factional demographic faultlines are positively related to competitive conflict 
management and moderately negatively related to cooperative conflict management. 
Moreover, perceived subgroup formation – as suggested by social categorization theory – 
mediates the relationship between factional demographic faultlines and conflict 
management strategies. Finally, our results corroborate the notion that board reflexivity – 
overt reflection on the board’s objectives, strategies and processes – attenuates the 
relationship between factional demographic faultlines and perceived subgroup formation 
within boards. 
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Theoretical implications and contributions 
The present study has several implications. First, building from the upper echelon 
tradition (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), for decades board researchers have devoted 
substantial attention to understanding the effects of board composition on board decision 
making processes (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
However, as noted, very few of these studies have taken into account that in many 
instances board members can be viewed as representatives of specific (interest) groups, 
leading to the existence of so-called factions within boards. Our results demonstrate that 
factional affiliations among board members impose a first-order demarcation, affecting 
how other elements of board member characteristics influence board decision making 
processes (see also Li & Hambrick, 2005). Related to this, whereas most board scholars 
have interpreted board diversity as a source of information benefiting the board, there are 
alsonegative aspects affiliated with board diversity in the sense that diversity is related to 
subgroup formation (see Harrison & Klein, 2007, for different interpretations of 
diversity). This latter view, which is in line with faultline theory, has been recognized in 
the literature on group composition, but has been scantly acknowledged in upper echelon 
research and research on boards of directors (for notable exceptions see Kaczmarek et al., 
forthcoming; Tuggle et al., 2010). 
Second, we focused particularly on how the existence of factions influenced 
conflict management strategies, i.e. how boards manage internal conflicts. Particularly, in 
the context of conflict-laden exchanges between factions, the management of 
disagreements can be considered an important determinant of effective board decision 
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making (cf. Kaufman & Englander, 2005; Lan & Heracleous, 2010). Consequently, the 
management of such divergent interests is critical for effective board decision making. 
Individuals choose, whether or not consciously, a pattern of principles to guide them 
through episodes of conflict (Somech et al., 2009). We found support for our hypothesis 
that factional faultlines are related to conflict management. A recent study by Tuggle, 
Schnatterly and Johnson (2010) pertaining to the discussion of entrepreneurial issues 
within boards comes to a similar conclusion, indicating that demographic faultlines 
within boards may impede discussion among board members. Our results add to the 
extant literature by corroborating the notion that demographic faultlines affect decision 
making processes within boards. 
A third contribution of our study is that it underlines the importance of explicitly 
studying the mediating mechanisms that link board demography to board decision 
making processes. Although the importance of perceptions of diversity as a mechanism 
linking objective diversity to group processes has been recognized in theory (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989; Choi & Sy, 2010; Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002; van Knippenberg 
et al., 2004; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), few studies have actually included measures of 
such perceptions. Specifically in the context of this present study, inferring board 
processes from publicly available data obtained outside the boardroom may introduce 
empirical fallacies in the analysis of board processes (Lawrence, 1997; Priem, Lyon, & 
Dess, 1999). Indeed, Kaczmarek et al. (forthcoming) inferred board processes from 
publicly available data to examine the relationship between faultlines and firm 
performance. Although they do find the anticipated negative relationship and their study 
provides valuable insights, such an analysis based on publicly available data may lead to 
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erroneous inferences. Our study therefore adds to current research endeavours by 
explicitly demonstrating the mechanisms through which demographic faultlines affect 
board functioning. In accordance with social categorization theory, we have included 
perceived subgroup formation as the mediating mechanism linking factional demographic 
faultlines to conflict management strategies. Our study thus adds to the literature on 
diversity and on demographic faultlines in particular. 
Fourth, we have demonstrated the attenuating role of board reflexivity in the 
relationship between factional demographic faultlines and perceived subgroup formation. 
In the same vein, a great deal of governance scholars argues that board evaluations are 
critical for the effective functioning of boards, because they facilitate reflection on board 
functioning within boards. Sonnenfeld (2002), for instance, notes that “no matter how 
good a board is, it’s bound to get better if it’s reviewed intelligently” (p. 113). In 
addition, board evaluations are required by many corporate governance codes (Minichilli 
et al., 2007). One of the main principles of the UK corporate governance code, for 
instance, states that “(t)he board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual 
evaluation of its own performance” (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). Similar 
arrangements can be found for other countries around the world (e.g., the Netherlands, 
Germany, Australia, the United States). However, board scholars rarely address the 
effects of reflection on board functioning by the board members themselves. In this 
respect, the present study is one of the first academic studies that empirically assesses the 
attenuating role of reflexivity for boards of directors. Specifically, our results indicate 
that reflecting on board processes ameliorates social categorization processes fostered by 
factional demographic faultlines (see also van Ginkel & van Knippenberg, 2009). Thus, 
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whether demographic differences between factions hurt board functioning depends in 
large part on whether boards reflect on their internal processes. 
 
Managerial Implications 
Effective board functioning is generally associated with board members cooperating to 
exchange information, to evaluating the merits of competing alternatives, and reaching 
well-reasoned decisions (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Group processes facilitating or 
hampering the effective functioning of boards should therefore be considered as a 
particularly relevant topic for practitioners. However, practitioners and regulatory bodies 
generally build on the assumption that board diversity is beneficial for board decision 
making. Our results suggest that practitioners, including board members, should be 
attuned to the possible disruptive effects from diversity. These disruptive effects from 
diversity are most pervasive when boards consist of factional groups and when multiple 
characteristics align with factional affiliations, resulting in so-called demographic 
faultlines. 
 In any case, practitioners should be aware that while factional demographic 
faultlines can be disruptive, there are ways to leverage and curb these negative aspects. 
Our results show that board reflexivity may counter the potential detrimental effects of 
diversity. By overtly reflecting on board processes, board members can attenuate the 
negative influence of social categorization processes fostered by factional demographic 
faultlines. This may be achieved through instigation by the chairperson or by fostering 
board members’ reflexivity through training. In this context, as was noted above 
regulatory bodies in various countries are increasingly stressing the necessity of board 
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evaluations as an important instrument for board members to reflect on their board’s 
effectiveness. Additionally, in order to reduce the disruptive effects from factional 
demographic faultlines, it may be wise for boards to appoint board members from 
different factions who do not simultaneously differ from one another on multiple 
characteristics to begin with. That is, boards may curb the emergence of factional 
demographic faultlines by managing the board’s composition. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
There are a number of limitations that warrant attention. These limitations also provide 
fertile ground for future research. This study adds to a growing body of research on the 
inner working of boards of directors (e.g., Tuggle et al., 2010; Westphal & Khanna, 2003; 
Westphal & Stern, 2007). There is, however, only limited research available on the 
impact of factions and demographic faultlines on processes within boards of directors 
(e.g., Kaczmarek et al., forthcoming; Tuggle et al., 2010).  This is in part due to 
difficulties in garnering access to boards and collecting data on decision making 
processes within boards, especially on a longitudinal basis. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties in acquiring access to boards, an important limitation is that although our 
theoretical model implies a specific causal order, our cross-sectional data only allows 
testing whether relationships are in line with our hypotheses. Future research on boards of 
directors should therefore aim to incorporate a longitudinal design and field experiments 
to test for causal relationships. 
Our analysis focuses on the board level. Our data did not permit us to assess 
social relationships among individual board members in view of our data. Rather than 
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interpreting boards of directors as monolithic entities, researchers might engage in careful 
examination of board members as individuals and processes operating between board 
members at the dyadic level of analysis (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008; 
Hillman et al., 2011). Thus future inquiries may benefit from a fine-grained analysis 
studying the determinants of board decision processes and outcomes at multiple levels of 
analysis. 
A further limitation of our study pertains to the specificity of the sampled boards 
of directors, namely pension fund boards. Future studies may further contribute to our 
understanding of factional demographic faultlines in boards of directors of different types 
of organizations. Finally, future research may also examine to what extent the issues 
analysed in the present study are related to organizational performance. Arguably board 
functioning will impact performance, further research in this direction is warranted, 
however. 
Although a great deal of literature on boards has studied the effects of board 
composition on board effectiveness, these studies generally interpret board diversity as a 
source of information (diversity as variety, see Harrison & Klein, 2007) that may benefit 
the board. Fewer studies have addressed diversity as a factor engendering subgroupings 
within boards (diversity as separation, see Harrison & Klein, 2007). The present study 
shows that board diversity negatively affects board functioning through subgroup 
formation. However, our study also demonstrates that the negative effects from diversity 
may be curbed through reflection on board functioning. This is an important message for 
both board scholars and practitioners. 
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 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Natural log number of participants 8.26 1.93            
2 Sector fund dummy 0.20 0.40 .61**           
3 Independent professional fund 
dummy 
0.01 0.11 .01 -.06          
4 Board size 6.96 2.28 .58** .23** .06         
5 Average age 54.27 4.34 .09 .07 .05 .09        
6 Percentage female 0.09 0.12 .15** .11 .33** .03 -.22**       
7 Board heterogeneity 0.00 1.49 .09 .00 .11 .09 -.24** .65**      
8 Competitive conflict management 3.12 0.88 .02 .11 .00 .01 -.02 -.11* -.08     
9 Cooperative conflict management 5.26 0.72 -.09 -.06 .06 -.10 .01 .12* .10 -.26**    
10 Factional demographic faultlines 0.53 1.54 -.09 -.08 -.06 -.15** .01 -.03 .22** .15** -.05   
11 Perceived subgroup formation 2.37 1.00 .21** .10 .08 .29** .07 .04 .11 .47** -.37** .12*  
12 Board reflexivity 4.82 0.98 .13* .09 -.18** .04 .06 .01 .05 -.29** .35** .07 -.34** 
 n = 313. *p < .05. **p < .01.              
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TABLE 2 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis 




























            
Natural log number of participants .05 .11 .12  -.05 -.05 -.08  -.05 -.05 -.03 
Sector fund dummy .01 .01 .00  .17* .17* .16**  -.02 -.02 -.02 
Independent professional fund dummy .07 .00 .05  .06 .07 .03  .02 .02 .04 
Board size .24*** .26*** .26***  .00 .03 -.11†  -.08 -.10 .01 
Average age .06 .08 .08  -.07 -.08 -.11*  .06 .07 .08 
Percentage female -.07 -.00 -.02  -.16† -.11 -.10  .11 .08 .07 
Board heterogeneity .13† .08 .10  .00 -.08 -.11  .05 .09 .12 
Factional demographic faultline  .18*** .22***   .18** .10†   -.09† -.02 
Board reflexivity  -.38*** -.42***         
Demographic faultline X Reflexivity   -.17***         
Perceived subgroup formation       .51***    -.39*** 
            
            
R2 .10*** .26*** .29***  .04 .07*** .29***  .03 .04 .17*** 
Delta R2   .16*** .03**    .03** .22***    .01 .13*** 
N=313. Standardized regression coefficients are reported.          
One tailed-tests for hypothesized effects and two-tailed for controls.         
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.           
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TABLE 3 
Results for simple mediation through Perceived Subgroup Formation 
  Boot indirect effect SE Bootstrap 95% confidence interval 
Indirect effect on competitive conflict management lower bound upper bound 
Effect 0.04 0.02 .01 .10 
         
Indirect effect on cooperative conflict management   
Effect -0.03 0.01 -.07 -.01 
              
n = 313. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size is 5,000. 






Results for Conditional Indirect Effects 
        
Panel A Competitive conflict management    
Conditional Indirect Effect through Perceived Subgroup Formation  
Board reflexivity Boot indirect effect Boot SE 
Bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval 
Conditional indirect effect at board reflexivity = M ± 1 SD lower bound upper bound 
-1 SD (-0.98) 0.10 0.04 .05 .20 
M (0.00) 0.06 0.02 .02 .11 
+1 SD (0.98) 0.01 0.02 -.02 .07 
     
Panel B Cooperative Conflict Management   
Conditional Indirect Effect through Perceived Subgroup Formation  
Board reflexivity Boot indirect effect Boot SE 
Bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval 
Conditional indirect effect at board reflexivity = M ± 1 SD lower bound upper bound 
-1 SD (-0.98) -0.04 0.02 -.09 -.02 
M (0.00) -0.02 0.01 -.05 -.01 
+1 SD (0.98) 0.00 0.01 -.04 .01 
          
n = 313. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size is 5,000. 
Bootstrap 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence interval  
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FIGURE 2 
Perceived subgroup Formation at Different Values of Factional Demographic Faultlines 
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